Karine Villegas

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— We propose in this paper to reuse the existing payment infrastructure to introduce a proof of transaction genuineness computed by a smart card chip. The idea is to divide the amount of the transaction into several sub-amounts, which added together give the total amount. The sub-amounts are function of a secret shared with the bank, which can verify that(More)
Side-channel analysis is a powerful tool for retrieving secrets embedded in cryptographic devices such as smart cards. Although several practical solutions have been proposed to prevent the leakage of sensitive data, mainly the protection of the basic cryptographic operation itself has been thoroughly investigated. For example, for exponentiation-based(More)
The elliptic curve Curve25519 has been presented as protected against state-of-the-art timing-attacks [2]. This paper shows that a timing attack is still achievable against a particular X25519 implementation which follows the RFC 4 7748 requirements [10]. The attack allows the retrieval of the complete private key used in the ECDH protocol. This is achieved(More)
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