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Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
Social choice theory is concerned with the evaluation of alternative methods of collective decision-making, as well as with the logical foundations of welfare economics. In turn, welfare economics is
Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in an oligopoly with spillovers
This paper examines the positive and normative effects of cooperative R&D--whereby member firms commit themselves to the joint profit-maximizing level of R&D in a "precompetitive stage" but remain
Strategic Information Revelation
We analyze the problem in which agents have non-public information and are to play an asymmetric information game. The agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to
Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare
The relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi-Cournot market is examined. In the first place, we presuppose the existence of a strong ("first-best") government that can
Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice
Ever since the so-called paradox of voting was generalized by Arrow (1963) to every democratic method of collective decision-making, a vast literature has appeared (a) trying to circumvent Arrow's
Rational Choice, Collective Decision And Social Welfare (位相幾何学と経済学)
Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective
Individual Rights Revisited
Since Sen's contribution on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal, his formulation of libertarian rights has been under debate. In this paper, we highlight some important strands in this debate,
Intergenerational equity and sustainability
Introduction J.Roemer & K.Suzumura PART 1: EQUITY AMONG OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS Pension Contributions and Capital Accumulation T.Ihori Equity and Efficiency in Overlapping Generations Economies
Rational Choice and Revealed Preference
According to the currently dominant view, the choice behaviour of an agent is construed to be rational if there exists a preference relation R such that, for every set S of available states, the