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Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities.
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
It is proposed that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies and the probability of knowing the ‘image’ of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act.
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Extended evolutionary simulations of heterogeneous ensembles of probabilistic strategies including mutation and selection are presented and the unexpected success of another protagonist: Pavlov is reported, suggesting that cooperative behaviour in natural situations may often be based on win-stay, lose-shift.
Evolutionary game dynamics
Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical game theorists. In…
Ergodic Theory on Compact Spaces
Measure-theoretic dynamical systems.- Measures on compact metric spaces.- Invariant measures for continuous tranformations.- Time averages.- Ergodicity.- Mixing and transitivity.- Shifts and…
The Calculus of Selfishness
- K. Sigmund
- 24 January 2010
How does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers,…
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
The evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever-increasing cognitive demands.
Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
It is found that a small fraction of TFT players is essential for the emergence of reciprocation in a heterogeneous population, but only paves the way for a more generous strategy.
Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games
This paper focuses on frequency-dependent selection, and argues that game-theoretic arguments are more appropriate than optimization algorithms for studying frequency- dependent selection.
Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Neither other-regarding tendencies or preferences for reciprocity and equity, nor group selection or prescriptions from higher authorities, are necessary for the emergence and stability of rudimentary forms of sanctioning institutions regulating common pool resources and enforcing collaborative efforts.