We show that a social choice function is strategy-proof on a sufficiently rich domain of generalized single-peaked preferences if and only if it takes the form of voting by issues (“voting by committees”) satisfying a simple condition called the Intersection Property.Expand

In a general framework of abstract binary aggregation, we characterize aggregation problems in terms of the monotone Arrowian aggregators they admit.Expand

How can diversity be measured? What does it mean to value biodiversity? Can we assist Noah in constructing his preferences? To address these questions following Weitzman (1992,1998), we propose a… Expand

This paper raises the problem of how to define revealed probabilistic beliefs in the context of the capacity/Choquet Expected Utility model. At the center of the analysis is a decision-theoretically… Expand

Abstract Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is derived from a general result on social aggregation in ‘property spaces’ (S3 convex structures) obtained in prior work. In the derivation, the specific… Expand

The authors study preferences over Savage acts that map states to opportunity sets and satisfy the Savage axioms. Preferences over opportunity sets may exhibit a preference for flexibility due to an… Expand

We show that for conclusion- and premise-based aggregation rules to be mutually consistent, the aggregation must always be “oligarchic”, that is: unanimous within a subset of agents, and typically even be dictatorial.Expand

We prove that a strategy-proof social choice function is efficient if and only if it satisfies a weak neutrality condition and is either almost dictatorial, or defined on a median space of dimension less than or equal to two.Expand