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The structure of strategy-proof social choice - Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
TLDR
We show that a social choice function is strategy-proof on a sufficiently rich domain of generalized single-peaked preferences if and only if it takes the form of voting by issues (“voting by committees”) satisfying a simple condition called the Intersection Property. Expand
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Abstract Arrowian aggregation
TLDR
In a general framework of abstract binary aggregation, we characterize aggregation problems in terms of the monotone Arrowian aggregators they admit. Expand
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A Theory of Diversity
  • K. Nehring, C. Puppe
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Electron. Notes Discret. Math.
  • 1 April 1999
How can diversity be measured? What does it mean to value biodiversity? Can we assist Noah in constructing his preferences? To address these questions following Weitzman (1992,1998), we propose aExpand
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Capacities And Probabilistic Beliefs: A Precarious Coexistence
This paper raises the problem of how to define revealed probabilistic beliefs in the context of the capacity/Choquet Expected Utility model. At the center of the analysis is a decision-theoreticallyExpand
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Ambiguity in the Context of Probabilistic Beliefs
TLDR
This version is still quite rough and incomplete; it is also clearly too long, and will most likely be split in future versions. Expand
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Arrow’s theorem as a corollary
Abstract Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is derived from a general result on social aggregation in ‘property spaces’ (S3 convex structures) obtained in prior work. In the derivation, the specificExpand
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Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework
The authors study preferences over Savage acts that map states to opportunity sets and satisfy the Savage axioms. Preferences over opportunity sets may exhibit a preference for flexibility due to anExpand
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Continuous Extensions of an Order on a Set to the Power Set
TLDR
This paper addresses the problem of extending an order on a set to a ranking of its subsets based on principles of independence and continuity. Expand
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Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
TLDR
We show that for conclusion- and premise-based aggregation rules to be mutually consistent, the aggregation must always be “oligarchic”, that is: unanimous within a subset of agents, and typically even be dictatorial. Expand
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Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
TLDR
We prove that a strategy-proof social choice function is efficient if and only if it satisfies a weak neutrality condition and is either almost dictatorial, or defined on a median space of dimension less than or equal to two. Expand
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