K. Mcdaniel

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Say that something is a material object just in case every part of that object is located at some region of space. Say that an object is gunky just in case every part of that object has a proper(More)
I am attracted to ontological pluralism, the doctrine that some things exist in a different way than other things.1 For the ontological pluralist, there is more to learn about an object’s existential(More)
In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap, the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has(More)
MaxCon entails that for any continuous shape you choose, if it is possible that some spatial region with that shape is filled with matter while not simultaneously being a proper sub-region of some(More)
Recently, I’ve championed the doctrine that fundamentally different sorts of things exist in fundamentally different ways. On this view, what it is for an entity to be can differ across ontological(More)
Let us agree that everything that there is exists, and that to be, to be real, and to exist are one and the same. Does everything that there is exist to the same degree? Or do some things exist more(More)
I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as(More)
Philosophical questions concerning parts and wholes have received a tremendous amount of the attention of contemporary analytic metaphysicians. In what follows, I discuss some of the central(More)