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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-ridingExpand
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The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories.
This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attemptsExpand
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Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: it increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it alsoExpand
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Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists haveExpand
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Fairness and contract design
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary andExpand
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Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance
This paper offers a new explanation for the prevalent use of convertible securities in venture capital finance. Convertible securities can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow rights as aExpand
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Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment
A major puzzle in the literature on social preferences is that a large majority of subjects behaves as if completely self-interested in some circumstances, such as in competitive experimental marketsExpand
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Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem
In this article, we analyze the canonical hold-up model of Hart and Moore under the assumption that the courts can verify delivery of the good by the seller. It is shown that no further renegotiationExpand
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The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach
This article develops a model of privatization using an incomplete contracts approach. We argue that different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside informationExpand
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Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
A two-person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff. Suppose there is a positive priorExpand
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