Justin Burkett

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We perform laboratory experiments comparing auctions with endogenous budget constraints. A principal imposes a budget limit on a bidder (an agent) in response to a principal-agent problem. In contrast to the existing literature where budget constraints are exogenous, this theory predicts that tighter constraints will be imposed in first-price auctions than(More)
In prior literature, bidders’ budget constraints have been shown to change revenue and efficiency rankings among auction formats. These results, however, are based on the implicit assumption that the nature of the budget constraint is unaffected by auction rules. I extend the standard symmetric model of auctions for a single good to include principals(More)
I study a principal’s optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal’s beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The results link the observed use of budget constraints to their use(More)
I study efficient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests(More)
I study e cient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and e ciency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests cases(More)
Title of dissertation: ESSAYS ON AUCTION THEORY Justin Ellis Burkett, Doctor of Philosophy, 2012 Dissertation directed by: Professor Lawrence M. Ausubel Department of Economics This dissertation studies two features of high-value auctions that are not explicitly captured by the standard models in the auction theory literature. The first is that bidders in(More)
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