This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks.
For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed.
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of finance. Abstract: This paper o¤ers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The… (More)
This paper provides an axiomatic approach to characterizing the Nash architectures in directed networks. In a directed network (also called one-way flow networks) when player i establishes a link with player j, only player i is able to access player j's information. Player j must establish a separate link with i to gain access to her information. The common… (More)
Please send questions and/or remarks of non-scientific nature to email@example.com. Abstract We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy… (More)
We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs better when it is less popular. Despite that, clustering may… (More)