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We investigate the welfare properties of the one-sector neoclassic growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. We focus on the constrained efficiency notion of the general equilibrium literature, and we demonstrate constrained inefficiency for our model. We provide a characterization of constrained efficiency that uses the first-order condition of a(More)
Executive summary The Healthy Cities movement has been in process for almost 30 years, and the features needed to transform a city into a healthy one are becoming increasingly understood. What is less well understood, however, is how to deliver the potential health benefi ts and how to ensure that they reach all citizens in urban areas across the world.(More)
I show in this paper that in an overlapping generations economy with productionà la Diamond (1970) in which the agents can only save in terms of capital (i.e. with no asset bubblesà la Tirole (1985) or public debt as in Diamond (1965)), there is a period-by-period balanced fiscal policy supporting a steady state allocation that Pareto-improves upon the(More)
Consistent high-quality of papers published in ''Toxicology in Vitro'' can only be maintained with the cooperation and dedication of a number of expert referees. The Editors would like to thank all those who have donated the hours necessary to review, evaluate and comment on manuscripts; their conscientious efforts have enabled the journal to maintain its(More)
This paper establishes, in the context of the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with production, that the risk that savings in unbacked assets (like fiat money or public debt) become worthless implies that, not only the first-best steady state, but even the best steady state attainable with those saving instruments fails to be a competitive(More)
We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or(More)
This is one of ten case studies that were part of an IIED research programme on " Urban Poverty Reduction Programmes: Lessons of Experience ". The research was undertaken with support from the UK Government's Department for International Development/DFID (project number R6859) and from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The publications(More)
In an overlapping generations economy setup we show that, if individuals can improve their life expectancy by exerting some effort, costly in terms of either resources or utility, the competitive equilibrium steady state differs from the first best steady state. This is due to the fact that under perfect competition individuals fail to anticipate the impact(More)