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This paper proposes several operational approaches for solving fair allocation problems in the context of multiagent optimization. These problems arise in various contexts such as assigning conference papers to referees or sharing of indivisible goods among agents. We present and discuss various social welfare functions that might be used to maximize the… (More)

Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents' preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be… (More)

This paper deals with the implementation of Social Choice Functions in fair multiagent decision problems. In such problems the determination of the best alternatives often relies on the maximization of a non-utilitarian Social Welfare Function so as to account for equity. However, in such decision processes, agents may have incentive to misreport their… (More)

Multiobjective Dynamic Programming (MODP) is a general problem solving method used to determine the set of Pareto-optimal solutions in optimization problems involving discrete decision variables and multiple objectives. It applies to combi-natorial problems in which Pareto-optimality of a solution extends to all its sub-solutions (Bellman principle). In… (More)

Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. In the first part of the paper we focus on the setting in which agents express additive cardinal utilities over objects. We present computational hardness results as well as polynomial-time algorithms for testing Pareto optimality under… (More)

The class of Groves mechanisms has been attracting much attention in mechanism design literature due to two attractive characteristics: utilitarian efficiency (also called social welfare maximization) and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, when strategic agents can create multiple fake identities and reveal more than one preference under… (More)

We consider a Plurality-voting scenario, where the candidates are split between parties, and each party nominates exactly one candidate for the final election. We study the computational complexity of deciding if there is a set of nominees such that a candidate from a given party wins in the final election. In our second problem, the goal is to decide if a… (More)

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