Julien Lesca

Learn More
Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents' preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be(More)
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. In the first part of the paper we focus on the setting in which agents express additive cardinal utilities over objects. We present computational hardness results as well as polynomial-time algorithms for testing Pareto optimal-ity under(More)
Multiobjective Dynamic Programming (MODP) is a general problem solving method used to determine the set of Pareto-optimal solutions in optimization problems involving discrete decision variables and multiple objectives. It applies to combi-natorial problems in which Pareto-optimality of a solution extends to all its sub-solutions (Bellman principle). In(More)
The class of Groves mechanisms has been attracting much attention in mechanism design literature due to two attractive characteristics: utilitarian efficiency (also called social welfare maximization) and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, when strategic agents can create multiple fake identities and reveal more than one preference under(More)
The coalition structure generation (CSG) problem consists in partitioning a group of agents into coalitions to maximize the sum of their values. We consider here the case of coalitional games whose characteristic function is compactly represented by a set of weighted conjunctive formulae (an MC-net). In this context the CSG problem is known to be(More)