Julian De Freitas

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Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or(More)
The underlying units of attention are often discrete visual objects. Perhaps the clearest form of evidence for this is the same-object advantage: Following a spatial cue, responses are faster to probes occurring on the same object than they are to probes occurring on other objects, while equating brute distance. Is this a fundamentally spatial effect, or(More)
Moral judgment depends upon inferences about agents' beliefs, desires, and intentions. Here, we argue that in addition to these factors, people take into account the moral optimality of an action. Three experiments show that even agents who are ignorant about the nature of their moral decisions are held accountable for the quality of their decision—a kind(More)
How do ordinary people decide whether an individual object at t 1 is the same individual at t 2 ? We show that valence— people's value judgments about whether a given trait is good or bad—can influence this decision. This effect is explained by people's tendency to believe that the underlying essence of an entity is good, and may be part of a far wider(More)
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