Juan Sebastián Pereyra

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We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools’ preferences for diversity. We show that the(More)
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others(More)
The environmental quality of destination has become a tool that hotels have to hold the tourism demand. In this paper we are going to present a model of vertical differentiation in the accommodation industry, where differentiation is associated with quality. Additionally, we assume the existence of a lump sum tax in the accommodation industry. Two are the(More)
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The environmental quality of destination has become a tool that hotels have to hold the tourism demand. In this paper we are going to present a model of vertical differentiation in the accommodation industry, where differentiation is associated with quality. Additionally, we assume the existence of a lump sum tax in the accommodation industry. Two are the(More)
This paper discusses the strategic manipulation of stable matching mechanisms. We provide a model of a two-sided matching market, in which a firm hires a worker, and each of them receives non-transferable utility. Assuming that the utilities are randomly drawn from underlying distributions, we measure the likelihood of differences in utilities from(More)
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