Juan Carlos Carbajal

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In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; lexicographic affine maximization. We introduce the notion of a flexible domain of preferences that(More)
We consider the problem of optimal contract design between a monopolist and a continuum of potential buyers under asymmetric information, when consumers have reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. In our model, consumers are endowed with quasi-linear utilities over the quality parameter of a good sold by a monopolist. The total valuation for(More)
We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer’s valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type), and a gain-loss valuation that depends on deviations of purchased quality from a reference point. Following(More)
Empirical evidence from sequential auctions shows that prices of identical goods tend to decline between rounds. In this paper, I show how expectations-based reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion can rationalize this phenomenon. I analyze two-round sealed-bid auctions with symmetric bidders having independent private values and unit demand.(More)
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