Joshua Klayman

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The process of hypothesis testing entails both information selection (asking questions) and information use (drawing inferences from the answers to those questions). We demonstrate that although subjects may be sensitive to diagnosticity in choosing which questions to ask, they are insufficiently sensitive to the fact that different answers to the same(More)
Judges were asked to make numerical estimates (e.g., "In what year was the first flight of a hot air balloon?"). Judges provided high and low estimates such that they were X% sure that the correct answer lay between them. They exhibited substantial overconfidence: The correct answer fell inside their intervals much less than X% of the time. This contrasts(More)
People are inaccurate judges of how their abilities compare to others'. J. Kruger and D. Dunning (1999, 2002) argued that unskilled performers in particular lack metacognitive insight about their relative performance and disproportionately account for better-than-average effects. The unskilled overestimate their actual percentile of performance, whereas(More)
The literature in cognitive psychology has described a variety of shortcomings that prevent individuals from learning effectively. We review this literature and provide examples ofa number oforganizational practices that may effectively repair thecognitive shortcomings of individuals. We call these practices cognitive repairs. We then discuss six tradeoffs(More)
Many studies have reported that the confidence people have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and that overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task. However, some common analyses confound systematic psychological effects with statistical effects that are inevitable if judgments are imperfect. We present three experiments using new methods(More)
When a person is makes a judgment and assesses confidence, what is the effect of receiving more judgment-relevant information? Following up prior research on belief updating judgments (Oskamp, 1965; Slovic, 1973), we demonstrated that the predictive accuracy of experts did not improve but their confidence climbed steadily as they received more information(More)
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