Joseph Peter Hughes

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This paper explores how to incorporate banks’ capital structure and risk-taking into models of production. In doing so, the paper bridges the gulf between (1) the banking literature that studies moral hazard effects of bank regulation without considering the underlying microeconomics of production and (2) the literature that uses dual profit and cost(More)
Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon that may enhance stakeholders’ value if managers do not sacrifice value to build empires. We find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment at U.S. bank holding companies that have higher levels of managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset size. At banks(More)
BACKGROUND Previous work from this department has shown that resistive tracheostomy filters increase the partial pressure of oxygen in capillary blood and also provide a significant amount of heat/moisture exchange. Until now it has not been shown whether there is any long-term beneficial effect and in particular whether raised tissue oxygenation is(More)
We amend the standard cost model to account for financial capital’s role in banking. The cost function is conditioned on the level of capital, but we model the demand for financial capital so it can serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk-averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed outsiders. Scale economies are then(More)
For nearly two decades banks in the United States have consolidated in record numbers—in terms of both frequency and the size of the merging institutions. Rhoades (1996) hypothesizes that the main motivations were increased potential for geographic expansion created by changes in state laws regulating branching and a more favorable antitrust climate. To(More)
We present and estimate a model that shifts the focus of modeling production from the traditional assumptions of profit maximization and cost minimization to a more general assumption of managerial utility maximization that can incorporate risk incentives into the analysis of production and recover valuemaximizing technologies. We implement the model using(More)
The Great Recession focused attention on large financial institutions and systemic risk. We investigate whether large size provides any cost advantages to the economy and, if so, whether these cost advantages are due to technological scale economies or too-big-to-fail subsidies. Estimating scale economies is made more complex by risk-taking. Better(More)
Over the past two decades, a variety of deregulatory measures have increased competition in the U.S. commercial banking industry. While increased competitive rivalry creates incentives for banks to operate more efficiently, it also creates incentives for banks to take additional risk, potentially threatening the safety of banking and payments system.(More)