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Infant perception of a manual pickup event. Br. Doesn't see, doesn't know: Is anticipatory looking really related to understanding of belief? Dev. Young children who abandon error behaviourally still have to free themselves mentally: A retrospective test for inhibition in intuitive physics. In his Research Focus ([1] this issue) Leslie argues that the idea(More)
The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known(More)
This research draws together Tulving's (1985) view on episodic memory and research on children's developing "theory of mind." Episodic memory, in its technical meaning given by Tulving, requires the autonoetic consciousness of having experienced remembered events, but developmental findings suggest that children cannot encode events as experienced before(More)
Two studies investigated the parallel developmental progress in theory of mind and executive control, as exemplified by correlations between the Dimensional Change Card Sorting task (DCCS; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995) and the false-belief task. Experiment 1 with sixty 3-year-old children confirmed earlier studies (e.g., Perner & Lang, 2002), suggesting(More)
The dimensional change card-sorting task (DCCS task) is frequently used to assess young children's executive abilities. However, the source of children's difficulty with this task is still under debate. In the standard DCCS task, children have to sort, for example, test cards with a red cherry or a blue banana into two boxes marked with target cards showing(More)
Reviews [Frith, U., Frith, C.D., 2003. Development and neurophysiology of mentalising. Philos. Trans. R. Soc., B 358, 685-694.] of several imaging studies report robust involvement of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in "theory of mind" (ToM) tasks. Surprisingly, this activation is notably absent when judging another person's visual perspective [Vogeley, K.,(More)
I contrast Fodor's theory of the child's Very Simple Theory of Mind (VSTM), which differs from adult folk psychology only in that it recognizes fewer intentional objects, with my view that children's concepts cross-cut the adult conceptual system. More specifically, young children do not distinguish between the state of affairs a belief is about and how(More)