José Víctor Rodríguez

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We analyze the decision of an agent with time inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare. The extent of the externality is initially unknown, but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure. We show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions, incomplete learning may occur(More)
This paper argues that gender discrimination is an inefficient practice. We model gender discrimination as the complete exclusion of females from the labor market or as the exclusion of females from managerial positions. The distortions in the allocation of talent between managerial and unskilled positions, and in human capital investment, are analyzed. It(More)
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, economic agents learn from their past mistaken predictions by combining new and old information to form new beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the policy maker, by affecting the private agents’ learning process, determines the speed at which the economy converges to the rational expectation(More)
Acknowledging that wage inequality and intergenerational mobility are strongly interrelated, this paper presents a model in which both are jointly determined. The model enables us to study how inequality and mobility are affected by exogenous changes and what determines their correlation. A main implication of the model is that differences in the amount of(More)
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE: Alice Albonico, Guido Ascari, Rosalba Longhi, Lorenza Rossi, Maria Vittoria Tantardini. SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE: Guido Ascari (University of Pavia), Giorgio Bellettini (University of Bologna), Gianluca Femminis (University Cattolica of Milano), Francesco Lippi (University of Sassari), Marco Maffezzoli (Bocconi University), Alessandro(More)