José Antonio Cheibub

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  • JANA KUNICOVÁ, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, +8 authors Frances Rosenbluth
  • 2005
Electoral rules and constitutional structures can influence the level of political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties(More)
Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? Do legislative deadlocks occur when presidents do not form majoritarian governments? Are presidential democracies more brittle when they are ruled by minorities? We answer these questions observing almost all democracies that existed between 1946 and 1999. It turns out(More)
The International IDEA Handbook Series seeks to present comparative analysis, information and insights on a range of democratic institutions and processes. Handbooks are aimed primarily at policy makers, politicians, civil society actors and practitioners in the field. They are also of interest to academia, the democracy assistance community and other(More)
This paper investigates how electoral rules influence political corruption. We show that closed-list and open-list proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corruption relative to plurality systems. We argue that this effect is due to differences in the locus of rents between PR and plurality systems, and to monitoring difficulties(More)
Acknowledgments: We thank Adam Przeworski, Tasos Kalandrakis and, especially, Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo, who has participated in many of the conversations that led to this paper. We also thank the Leitner Program in International Political Economy at Yale University for support for this research and the Fundação de Pesquisa e Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado(More)
T he view that multiparty elections in changing authoritarian regimes should be held sooner rather than later has been increasingly under attack. Critics argue that, under conditions of low institutional development, multiparty elections may lead to violence and civil war, rather than to the peaceful allocation of authority that everyone desires. Starting(More)
What are the conditions that generate minority presidents and deadlock in presidential regimes? What is the impact of minority presidents and deadlock on the survival of these regimes? Based on data for all presidential and mixed democracies that existed between 1946 and 1996, I show (1) that characteristics of the electoral and party systems do affect the(More)
This paper evaluates existing measures of political regimes and political freedom with respect to their desirability as indicators of political capabilities. It argues that the focus of desirable measures should be on the political and civil institutions that affect individuals' opportunities to pursue their goals (their capabilities). Attempts to capture "(More)