José Antonio Cheibub

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  • JANA KUNICOVÁ, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, +8 authors Frances Rosenbluth
  • 2005
Electoral rules and constitutional structures can influence the level of political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties(More)
Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? Do legislative deadlocks occur when presidents do not form majoritarian governments? Are presidential democracies more brittle when they are ruled by minorities? We answer these questions observing almost all democracies that existed between 1946 and 1999. It turns out(More)
This paper examines the impact of the form of government—–presidential or parliamentary—–on fiscal outcomes in democratic systems. Based on data for democracies in 98 countries between 1970 and 2002, it shows that the gross domestic product ratio of the central government budget balance is higher in presidential than in parliamentary democracies. It also(More)
This paper investigates how electoral rules influence political corruption. We show that closed-list and open-list proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corruption relative to plurality systems. We argue that this effect is due to differences in the locus of rents between PR and plurality systems, and to monitoring difficulties(More)
We review arguments and empirical evidence found in the comparative literature that bear on the differences in the survival rates of parliamentary and presidential democracies. Most of these arguments focus on the fact that presidential democracies are based on the separation of executive and legislative powers, while parliamentary democracies are based on(More)
T he view that multiparty elections in changing authoritarian regimes should be held sooner rather than later has been increasingly under attack. Critics argue that, under conditions of low institutional development, multiparty elections may lead to violence and civil war, rather than to the peaceful allocation of authority that everyone desires. Starting(More)
Citizens in a democracy can only hold elected officials to account if they are able to correctly assess politicians’ performance. While there is ample evidence that individuals learn and take political cues from favored sources, these sources may have incentives to dissemble. When will citizens discern between more and less credible source of political(More)
What are the conditions that generate minority presidents and deadlock in presidential regimes? What is the impact of minority presidents and deadlock on the survival of these regimes? Based on data for all presidential and mixed democracies that existed between 1946 and 1996, I show (1) that characteristics of the electoral and party systems do affect the(More)