José Antonio Cheibub

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  • JANA KUNICOVÁ, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, +8 authors Frances Rosenbluth
  • 2005
Electoral rules and constitutional structures can influence the level of political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties(More)
The International IDEA Handbook Series seeks to present comparative analysis, information and insights on a range of democratic institutions and processes. Handbooks are aimed primarily at policy makers, politicians, civil society actors and practitioners in the field. They are also of interest to academia, the democracy assistance community and other(More)
This paper investigates how electoral rules influence political corruption. We show that closed-list and open-list proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corruption relative to plurality systems. We argue that this effect is due to differences in the locus of rents between PR and plurality systems, and to monitoring difficulties(More)
Acknowledgments: We thank Adam Przeworski, Tasos Kalandrakis and, especially, Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo, who has participated in many of the conversations that led to this paper. We also thank the Leitner Program in International Political Economy at Yale University for support for this research and the Fundação de Pesquisa e Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado(More)
T he view that multiparty elections in changing authoritarian regimes should be held sooner rather than later has been increasingly under attack. Critics argue that, under conditions of low institutional development, multiparty elections may lead to violence and civil war, rather than to the peaceful allocation of authority that everyone desires. Starting(More)
What are the conditions that generate minority presidents and deadlock in presidential regimes? What is the impact of minority presidents and deadlock on the survival of these regimes? Based on data for all presidential and mixed democracies that existed between 1946 and 1996, I show (1) that characteristics of the electoral and party systems do affect the(More)
  • Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Matthew S. Winters, +18 authors Jazmin Sierra
  • 2014
When are citizens most likely to hold politicians to account for wrongdoing? In a crowded information environment, political accountability can be achieved only if credible information is available and citizens are able to identify that information. In this paper, we argue that the ability to discern more from less credible information is increasing in(More)
Spatial models of voting predict that indifference about who wins elections will cause individuals to abstain from voting. Despite this strong theoretical expectation, empirical tests of the relationship between indifference and turnout offer contradictory results because no standard cross-national measure of indifference exists. Instead, the prior studies(More)
The conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy. This paper shows that existing evidence for this view is based on cross-sectional correlations, which disappear once we look at within-country variation. In other words, there is no evidence that countries that increase their education are more hkely to become democratic.