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We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The… (More)
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have sub-stitutable preferences but firms and workers may bè`single'' in one stable matching and matched in another one. We… (More)
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are… (More)
* We are grateful to a referee of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions. through grant 2001SGR-00162 and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). The paper was partially written while J. Massó was visiting the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and A. Neme was visiting the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. They acknowledge the hospitality of their… (More)
Outdoor carbon monoxide comes mainly from vehicular emissions, and high concentrations occur in areas with heavy traffic congestion. CO binds to hemoglobin, forming carboxyhemoglobin (COHb), and reduces oxygen delivery. We investigated the link between the adverse effects of CO on the respiratory system using COHb as a marker for chronic CO exposure. We… (More)
For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference pro…les into equivalence classes with the property that all pro…les in the same class have the same set of stable match-ings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.
abstract: For the many-to-one matching model with firms having sub-stitutable and q−separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. We also exhibit examples in which, under this restricted domain of firms'… (More)