Jonathan W. Leland

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Rubinstein's (1988) procedure for choosing between risky prospects, based, in part, upon similarities between prizes and probabilities across lotteries, is modified and extended to apply to a more general class of binary choices. This modified procedure is shown to imply behaviors following from Loomes and Sugden's (1982) Regret Theory, although under more(More)
Electrochemiluminescence (ECL) has been developed as a highly sensitive process in which reactive species are generated from stable precursors (i.e., the ECL-active label) at the surface of an electrode. This new technology has many distinct advantages over other detection systems: no radioisotopes are used; detection limits for label are extremely low (200(More)
The Internet is expected to have a positive impact on economic growth, and its adoption rate will determine the extent of this impact. In this paper, we examine how differences in willingness to trust influence Internet adoption rates across countries. We show that trust has a statistically significant influence on levels of Internet penetration across(More)
and three anonymous referees are acknowledged. 2 ABSTRACT The concept of strategic surprise has been used by writers on military strategy to explore the successful amplification of resources during battle. This paper applies the same concept to subcontracting relationships, and develops a cognitive framework to explain the phenomenon of strategic surprises,(More)
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION NOTICE: This report has been submitted for publication outside of IBM and will probably be copyrighted if accepted for publication. It has been issued as a Research Report for early dissemination of its contents. In view of the transfer of copyright to the outside publisher, its distribution outside of IBM prior to publication should be(More)
Prod. Ed: Our supplementary materials are needed to understand the article and therefore, they should be copy-edited, according to APA Website. These tables are cited in the paper with terminology such as " Table SM.1 " , etc. They appear at the end of this manuscript, after the figures. and anonymous reviewers for useful suggestions and discussions of(More)
The problems of how self-interested players can cooperate despite incentives to defect, and how players can coordinate despite the presence of multiple equilibria, are among the oldest and most fundamental in game theory. In this report, we demonstrate that a plausible and even natural specification of the reference outcome in a game simultaneously predicts(More)
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