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Understanding knowledge
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The Case for Rational Uniqueness
The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, EExpand
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Disagreement and Epistemic Peers
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Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?
Conciliatory views of disagreement are an intuitive class of views on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that making conciliation is often required upon discovering thatExpand
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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence
ABSTRACT Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formalExpand
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
1. Introduction 2. Idealized Disagreement 3. Steadfast Views of Disagreement 4. Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and the Equal Weight View 5. Objections to the Equal Weight View 6. EverydayExpand
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Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief
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How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View
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Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday
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Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem?
TLDR
The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Expand
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