Jonathan A. Zvesper

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The jury is still out concerning the epistemic conditions for backward induction, the “oldest idea in game theory” (Aumann, 1995, p. 635). Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1996) take conflicting positions in the debate: the former claims that common “knowledge” of “rationality” in a game of perfect information entails the backwardinduction solution; the latter(More)
We analyze the Brandenburger-Keisler paradox in epistemic game theory, which is a ‘two-person version of Russell’s paradox’. Our aim is to understand how it relates to standard one-person arguments, and why the ‘believes-assumes’ modality used in the argument arises. We recast it as a fixpoint result, which can be carried out in any regular category, and(More)
Logic is breaking out of the confines of the single-agent static paradigm that has been implicit in all formal systems until recent times. We sketch some recent developments that take logic as an account of information-driven interaction. These two features, the dynamic and the social, throw fresh light on many issues within logic and its connections with(More)
The main aim of this paper is to raise awareness of higherorder knowledge (knowledge about someone else’s knowledge) as an issue for computer game AI. We argue that a number of existing game genres, especially those involving social interaction, are natural fields of application for an approach we call explicit knowledge programming. We motivate the use of(More)
Motivated by the distributed implementation of game-theoretical algorithms, this paper proposes an explicit form of knowledge-based programming. Abstracting from the game-theoretical details, we describe a general scenario where a group of agents each have some initially private bits of information which they can then communicate to each other. We draw on(More)
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players’ rationality defined by means of ‘monotonic’ properties, with the iterated elimination of strategies that do not satisfy these properties. It(More)
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to(More)