• Publications
  • Influence
A Theory of Discrimination and Assimilation
In a heterogeneous society with two social groups possessing competing social norms, members of the relatively worse-off group face an incentive to adopt the social norms of the better-off group andExpand
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The Foundations of Spatial Preferences
Abstract I provide an axiomatic foundation for the assumption of specific utility functions in a multidimensional spatial model, endogenizing the spatial representation of the set of alternatives.Expand
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Asset Pricing and Asymmetric Reasoning
We present a theory and experimental evidence on pricing and portfolio choices under asymmetric reasoning. We show that under asymmetric reasoning, prices do not reflect all (types of) reasoning.Expand
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Tactical Extremism
We provide an instrumental theory of extreme campaign platforms. By adopting an extreme platform, a previously mainstream party with a relatively small probability of winning further reduces itsExpand
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United We Vote
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions forExpand
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A spatial theory of party formation
Members of an assembly that chooses policies on a series of multidimensional ideological issues have incentives to coalesce and coordinate their votes, forming political parties. If an agent has anExpand
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Cognitive Biases, Ambiguity Aversion and Asset Pricing in Financial Markets
We test to what extent financial markets trigger comparative ignorance (Fox and Tversky (1995)) when interpreting news, and hence, to what extent such markets instill ambiguity aversion inExpand
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Citizen candidates under uncertainty
  • Jon X. Eguia
  • Political Science, Computer Science
  • Soc. Choice Welf.
  • 25 July 2007
TLDR
In a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate. Expand
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Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms
TLDR
We propose a vote-buying mechanism that chooses the socially preferred alternative with a probability converging to one, as the society becomes large. Expand
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Utility Representations of Risk Neutral Preferences in Multiple Dimensions
I show that in a multidimensional spatial model, if an agent is risk neutral on each side of the policy space away from his/her ideal point, then his/her utility function is linearly decreasing notExpand
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