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We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by… (More)

- John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima
- J. Economic Theory
- 2010

We consider the matching problem with contracts of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that bilateral substitutes is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition,… (More)

- John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2009

Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals’ preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the… (More)

We introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasilinear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network structure. Furthermore, the set of stable outcomes is… (More)

- John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, +4 authors Alvin E. Roth
- 2010

We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (manyto-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms’ relationships do not exhibit a supply chain structure, stable allocations need not exist. By contrast, in the… (More)

- John William Hatfield
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2009

We consider the problem of designing a mechanism to allocate objects to agents when each agent has a quota that must be filled exactly. Agents are assumed to have responsive preferences over items. We show that the only strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and nonbossy mechanisms are sequential dictatorships. We also show that the only strategy-proof, Pareto… (More)

- Mihai Manea, Dilip Abreu, +10 authors Asher Wolinsky
- 2009

We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players that reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We prove that for each discount factor all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The equilibrium payoffs and the set of equilibrium… (More)

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent overall stable matchings. In oneto-one matching, the… (More)

- John William Hatfield
- J. Economic Theory
- 2005

In their recent paper, Roth et al. [Pairwise kidney exchange, J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 151–188] consider pairwise kidney exchanges, and show within this subset of feasible exchanges that a priority mechanism is strategy-proof. We show that this result can be broadened to allow much more general mechanisms and restrictions on the feasible set of… (More)

We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts which subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer-seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, in contrast to results for the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, preference substitutability is sufficient and necessary to guarantee the… (More)