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Electoral equilibria depend upon candidates' motivations. Maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election. Accordingly, it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations. This paper examines sufficient conditions for(More)
This paper provides a theory of political behavior based on loss aversion and apply it to electoral participation in midterm congressional elections. The theory incorporates both the turnout and vote decisions in one framework and predicts that the president's party will be disadvantaged in midterm elections (i.e., the theory predicts the " midterm effect(More)
This paper asks how information about candidates in the presidential race affects outcomes in congressional races. We develop a theory in which parties benefit from 'coattail' effects when a candidate's performance exceeds expectations. To test the predictions of our theory, we use a new measure of presidential coattails as a source of exogenous variation(More)
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