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Electoral equilibria depend upon candidates' motivations. Maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election. Accordingly, it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations. This paper examines sufficient conditions for(More)
In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both can-didates' and voters' strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to maximize their vote share. Accordingly, the main(More)
This paper examines decision-making by political candidates under three diierent objective functions. In particular, we are interested in when the optimal strategies for expected vote share, expected plurality, and probability of victory maximizing candidates coincide in simple plurality elections. It is shown here that if voters' behavior, conditional on(More)
In this paper, we examine the incentives facing candidates in the spatial voting model. We assume that voters' types are independent, but allow for nonidentical distributions across voters. Examining candidate positional equi-libria as a function of voter behavior, we nd that what we term p-symmetric strict p-local equilibria when candidates maximize(More)
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