John W. Patty

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In this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n ≥ 3 probabilistic voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory are “generically different” in a specific sense. More specifically, I first describe finite shyness (Anderson and Zame (2000)), a notion of genericity for infinite(More)
This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters’ strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections(More)
This paper explores a psychologically motivated model of belief formation in a political context. Using a retrospective voting framework, we specifically examine the implications of a common inference bias in which voters overweight the effect of an incumbent’s unobserved effort on realized outcomes. This bias is motivated by and consistent with the(More)
In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates’ and voters’ strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to maximize their vote share. Accordingly, the main(More)
This paper examines decision-making by political candidates under three di erent objective functions. In particular, we are interested in when the optimal strategies for expected vote share, expected plurality, and probability of victory maximizing candidates coincide in simple plurality elections. It is shown here that if voters' behavior, conditional on(More)
In this paper, we examine the incentives facing candidates in the spatial voting model. We assume that voters' types are independent, but allow for nonidentical distributions across voters. Examining candidate positional equilibria as a function of voter behavior, we nd that what we term p-symmetric strict p-local equilibria when candidates maximize(More)
Agenda control in legislative bodies is an important and complicated topic. Frequently, the discussion of agenda control is limited to procedures that restrict what may be considered on the floor, as exemplified by “closed rules” in the United States House of Representatives. In this paper, we expand the discussion of agenda control by considering the(More)
This paper explores a psychologically motivated model of belief formation in a political context. Using a retrospective voting framework, we specifically examine the implications of a common inference bias in which voters overweight the effect of an incumbent’s unobserved effort on realized outcomes. This bias is motivated by and consistent with the(More)