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This is the unedited penultimate draft of a BBS target article that has been accepted for publication (Copyright 1980: Cambridge University Press /-publication date provisional) and is currently being circulated for Open Peer Commentary. This preprint is for inspection only, to help prospective commentators decide whether or not they wish to prepare a(More)
  • J R Searle
  • 1998
The neurosciences have advanced to the point that we can now treat consciousness as a scientific problem like any other. The problem is to explain how brain processes cause consciousness and how consciousness is realized in the brain. Progress is impeded by a number of philosophical mistakes, and the aim of this paper is to remove nine of those mistakes:(More)
Most philosophers and linguists accept a certain conception of the notion of the literal meaning of words and sentences and the relation between literal meaning and other semantic notions such as ambiguity, metaphor, and truth. In this paper I want to challenge one aspect of this received opinion, the view that for every sentence the literal meaning of the(More)
Introducing the Reading In these two selections from Minds, Brains, and Science, John Searle takes on the mind/body problem and the question of artificial intelligence. Like most contemporary philosophers, Searle is a materialist. But Searle thinks that many contemporary philosophers have not adequately understood the problem of mind and its relation to the(More)
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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. The consciousness paradox : consciousness, concepts, and higher-order thoughts / Rocco J. Gennaro. p. cm.—(Representation and(More)
Cognitive Science is likely to make little progress in the study of humon behovior until we hove o clear account of what o humon action is. The aim of this paper is to present a sketch of a theory of action. I will locate the relation of intention to action within a general theory of Intentionality. I will introduce o distinction between prior intentions(More)
I have argued in a number of writings 1 that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form(More)
The neurosciences have advanced to the point that we can now treat consciousness as a scienti¢c problem like any other. The problem is to explain how brain processes cause consciousness and how consciousness is realized in the brain. Progress is impeded by a number of philosophical mistakes, and the aim of this paper is to remove nine of those mistakes: (i)(More)