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Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation
We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significantExpand
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Option Backdating and Board Interlocks
We examine the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries. TheExpand
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Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options
Abstract We use a large database on ESO exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility-based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior areExpand
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Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior
Abstract This paper examines how excessive concern over current stock price can motivate managers to use observable investment decisions to manipulate the market's inferences about the firm. TheExpand
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Are All CEOs above Average? An Empirical Analysis of Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design
Companies can potentially use compensation peer groups to inflate pay by choosing peers that are larger, choosing a high target pay percentile, or choosing peer firms with high pay. Although peersExpand
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Stock and Option Grants with Performance-Based Vesting Provisions
We assemble a sample of 983 equity-based awards that include either an accelerated- or a contingent-vesting provision tied to firm performance and explore the frequency, contractual nature, usage,Expand
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An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay
Motivated by the potential for opportunistic behavior in pay decisions, recent SEC and IRS regulations essentially preclude inside directors from serving on a firm's compensation committee. In thisExpand
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The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits
Large revisions in dividends are accompanied by stock price reactions for industry rivals of the announcing firm. Though these effects are near-zero on average, their magnitude differs systematicallyExpand
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Corporate Governance and Firm Diversification
We empirically investigate whether corporate governance structure is different between focused and diversified firms, and whether any differences in corporate governance are associated with the valueExpand
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The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm
The authors study the implications for shareholder wealth of interfirm antitrust litigation and how the costs of the dispute affect the propensity to settle. Upon filing, defendants experienceExpand
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