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We compare Gamson's Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two non-cooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal(More)
We investigate the impact of naïve advice on strategic play in signaling games. While both advisors and advisees start out with marginally higher levels of strategic play than individuals, both are nowhere near the level reported for two person teams. This is particularly surprising for advisees who, like teams, have two heads to work with, their own and(More)
The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange(More)
Extended Abstract In multi-unit demand, uniform-price auctions with synergies there are two opposing economic forces at work: Demand reduction resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have and synergies which promote more aggressive bidding. To capture these synergies a bidder often needs to bid above the standalone value(More)
We study three alternative implementations of the Vickrey (1961) multi-unit demand auction: Vickrey's original static sealed-bid auction and two dynamic alternatives, with and without public dropout information reported during the auction (Ausubel, 2004). Although implemented by a weaker solution concept, behavior in the dynamic Vickrey auction with the(More)
Group decision making provides a mechanism for channeling individual members' knowledge into productive organizational outcomes. However, in hidden profile experiments in which group members have common information favoring an inferior choice, with private information favoring a superior choice, groups typically choose an inferior alternative. We report a(More)
We present results from an experiment based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) model of auctions with resale. As predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that resale raises average auction prices. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts.(More)
Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and valuable assets and in some procurement auctions. Previous theoretical analysis shows that effcient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, as there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. This research takes a(More)
We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including " strange bedfel-low " coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the(More)
Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact on legislative bargaining of cuts versus increases in government spending. Using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic results in significant differences in bargaining outcomes: There are longer delays in reaching agreement with cuts than with(More)