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Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of " social preferences ". We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare—sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all(More)
We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers.(More)
We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative importance of efficiency, maximin preferences and inequality aversion, as well as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). While the Fehr and Schmidt model performs better in a direct comparison, this appears to be(More)
  • Guillaume Frechette, John Kagel, Massimo Morelli
  • 2003
The effects of changes in nominal bargaining power, the proposal selection rule and discounting in legislative bargaining outcomes are investigated. The comparative static predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model better organize behavior than does Gamson's Law (1961). However, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under Baron-Ferejohn as(More)
  • Raymond Battalio, Larry Samuelson, John Van Huyck, Menesh Patel, Bill Rankin, Nick Rupp +9 others
  • 1999
This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the same best-response correspondence and the same expected payoff from the mixed equilibrium, but differ in the incentive to play a best response rather than an inferior response. In each game, risk dominance conflicts with payoff dominance and selects an inefficient pure strategy(More)
Empirical studies in economics and behav-ioral ecology suggest that, ceteris paribus, animals and humans appear to place less weight on the future than on the present, i.e., they act as though they discount future payoffs. Furthermore (and more interestingly), they do so with discount rates that increase as the time before those payoffs are realized grows(More)
In this paper, we report the results of experiments designed to test whether individuals and groups abide by the axioms of monotonicity, with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and Bayesian updating, when making decisions in the face of risk. The results indicate a significant number of violations of both principles. The violation rate when groups(More)
Extended Abstract In multi-unit demand, uniform-price auctions with synergies there are two opposing economic forces at work: Demand reduction resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have and synergies which promote more aggressive bidding. To capture these synergies a bidder often needs to bid above the standalone value(More)
We de…ne a new concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games, including games without analytically tractable solutions. Finally,(More)
We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90%. Control sessions with repeated matchings over 8 subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot control sessions. In follow-up sessions(More)