John H. Kagel

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We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess some of the robust properties of learning noted in(More)
Players bargained over chips with different exchange rates and with different information regarding these exchange rates. Offers generally reflected a self-serving definition of fairness. There is ample evidence that relative income shares entered players utility functions, resulting in predictable variations in both rejection rates and offers. However,(More)
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We create an environment in which congestion forces agents to match inefficiently early. We then introduce one of two centralized clearinghouse mechanisms. One of these has been successfully used to halt this kind of unraveling in a number of labor markets, while the other has failed. When it is costly for Žrms andworkers to bemismatched comparedwith the(More)
Russell Sage Foundation are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks to my colleagues and my coauthors, especially Dan Levin, who have taught me so much. Much of the material here is taken from our more comprehensive survey titled " Bidding in Common Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, " which appears as Chapter 1 in the collection of our(More)
Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner’s curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced(More)
We report a gift exchange experiment in which there are no opportunities for reputation or repeated play game effects. In each play of the game, firms make wage offers to workers, and workers respond by either accepting or rejecting an offer and determining an effort level. Higher effort levels are more costly to workers and there is no mechanism for firms(More)
The effects of changes in nominal bargaining power, the proposal selection rule and discounting in legislative bargaining outcomes are investigated. The comparative static predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model better organize behavior than does Gamson’s Law (1961). However, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under Baron-Ferejohn as(More)