John E. Stovall

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This paper generalizes the representation results of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4] to incomplete preferences. As in the latter paper, we derive a unique subjective state space consisting of possible future preferences, but the agent may now hold more than one belief (aggregator) over states. This result permits an extension of Bewley’s [2] model of(More)
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [2008] attempt "[to identify] the broadest possible set of temptation-driven behavior." They argue that a desire for commitment characterizes such behavior. However, we argue that they go too far by including preferences which are not temptation-driven. We introduce two axioms which are stronger than their Desire for Commitment(More)
We use a preference-over-menus framework to model a decision maker who is a¤ected by multiple temptations. Our two main axioms on preference, Exclusion and Inclusion, identify when the agent would want to restrict his choice set and when he would want to expand his choice set. An agent who is tempted would want to restrict his choice set by excluding the(More)
We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules(More)
We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on division rules for the conflicting claims problem. With the addition of Consistency and Resource Monotonicity, this characterizes a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways. First, a rule is identified with a fixed monotone path in the space of awards, and for(More)
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