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We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters,… (More)

- John Duggan, Thomas Schwartz
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2000

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of socialchoice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit… (More)

- John Duggan, César Martinelli
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2001

We take a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of juries by modelling voting as a game of incomplete information. Rather than the usual assumption of two possible signals (one indicating guilt, the other innocence), we allow jurors to perceive a full spectrum of signals. Given any voting rule requiring a fixed fraction of votes to convict, we… (More)

We unify and extend much of the literature on probabilistic voting in two-candidate elections. We give existence results for mixed and pure strategy equilibria of the electoral game. We prove general results on optimality of pure strategy equilibria vis-a-vis a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, and we derive the well-known “mean voter” result as… (More)

We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. We show that if all legislators are risk… (More)

- Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan, Michel Le Breton
- J. Economic Theory
- 2002

We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably in...nite strategy spaces, and, as a special case, we obtain a longstanding claim to the same e¤ect, due to McKelvey (1986),… (More)

- Seok-ju Cho, John Duggan
- J. Economic Theory
- 2003

We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a “minimal” stationary equilibrium and of a “maximal” stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with… (More)

We provide simple mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of pollution, first assuming complete information across firms and then allowing for incomplete information. Both mechanisms operate by inducing firms to monitor one another, using firms’ reports to determine pollution allotments and transfers. The complete information mechanism determines a… (More)

- John Duggan, Tasos Kalandrakis
- J. Economic Theory
- 2012

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that… (More)

We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in amajority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from amultidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We… (More)