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A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of bargaining toExpand
A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries
A "jury theorem" is proved for the analysis of juries by modelling voting as a game of incomplete information: as the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule, except unanimity rule. Expand
A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is notExpand
Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information
An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent, andExpand
Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
A more straightforward generalization is proved that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them, based on a familiar lottery idea that allows ties but assumes perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. Expand
Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
We unify and extend much of the literature on probabilistic voting in two-candidate elections. We give existence results for mixed and pure strategy equilibria of the electoral game. We prove generalExpand
Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining
It is proved that existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor, are uniqueness. Expand
A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice
We develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one-dimensional space perceived by voters. Economic and political choicesExpand
A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner thenExpand
Dynamic legislative policy making
It is proved existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next, and a convergence theorem is established giving conditions under which the invariant distributions generated by stationaryEquilibrium must be close to the core in a canonical spatial model. Expand