Eric Battalio implemented the experimental design on the TAMU economics laboratory network. This paper was revised while Van Huyck was on a faculty development leave at the University of Pittsburgh. Abstract: This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly.… (More)
This paper reports an experiment testing whether strategically equivalent representations of a social situation produce equivalent behavior when actually played by human subjects. The investigation was limited to representative members of the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of perfect information, which include widely studied games in the… (More)
This paper reports an experiment designed to discover how the prospect of future interaction influences people's ability to tacitly cooperate in repeated dominance solvable games. The experiment varies two treatment variables: whether the constituent game is solvable by strict or iterated dominance and whether prospective interaction is finitely or randomly… (More)
This paper investigates the possibility that people discover effective heuristics when playing similar perfect information games of varying complexity. We call this discovery experience Eureka Learning. We use a change-point analysis to identify 35 percent of our subjects as Eureka Learners.