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1 Ž. In 'experience-weighted attraction' EWA learning, strategies have attractions that reflect initial predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine Ž. choice probabilities according to some rule e.g., logit. A key feature is a parameter ␦ that weights the strength of hypothetical reinforcement of strategies that were not chosen(More)
We use the experimental method to study people's adaptive behavior in a generic game with multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. The experiment was designed to discover if behavior diverged at the separatrix predicted by the fictitious play dynamic. The equilibrium selected was sensitive to small differences in initial conditions as predicted. The experiment(More)
Previous experiments using the minimum-effort coordination game reveal a striking regularity—large groups never coordinate efficiently. Given the frequency with which large real-world groups, such as firms, face similarly difficult coordination problems, this poses an important question: Why do we observe large, successfully coordinated groups in the real(More)
This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player's best response is an order statistic of the cohort's action combination. Unlike previous experiments using order statistic coordination games, the new experiment holds the payoff function(More)
This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the same best-response correspondence and the same expected payoff from the mixed equilibrium, but differ in the incentive to play a best response rather than an inferior response. In each game, risk dominance conflicts with payoff dominance and selects an inefficient pure strategy(More)
This paper investigates whether behavior in a coordination game changes when subjects are limited to the information used by reinforcement learning algorithms. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. Usually,(More)
Gender is rarely included as a factor in economics models. However, recent work in experimental economics, as well as in psychology and political science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic behavior. We examine gender differences in bargaining using the ''trust game'' introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). 1 In this(More)
In this paper we use the experimental method to determine whether reputation is a substitute for commitment in the Peasant-Dictator game. Reputation is an imperfect substitute for commitment in the experiment. It is less efficient on average. Its effectiveness as a substitute declines as the return on investment declines. However, there are cohorts that(More)