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1 Ž. In 'experience-weighted attraction' EWA learning, strategies have attractions that reflect initial predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine Ž. choice probabilities according to some rule e.g., logit. A key feature is a parameter ␦ that weights the strength of hypothetical reinforcement of strategies that were not chosen(More)
Previous experiments using the minimum-effort coordination game reveal a striking regularity—large groups never coordinate efficiently. Given the frequency with which large real-world groups, such as firms, face similarly difficult coordination problems, this poses an important question: Why do we observe large, successfully coordinated groups in the real(More)
This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player's best response is an order statistic of the cohort's action combination. Unlike previous experiments using order statistic coordination games, the new experiment holds the payoff function(More)
This paper investigates whether behavior in a coordination game changes when subjects are limited to the information used by reinforcement learning algorithms. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. Usually,(More)
Gender is rarely included as a factor in economics models. However, recent work in experimental economics, as well as in psychology and political science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic behavior. We examine gender differences in bargaining using the ''trust game'' introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). 1 In this(More)
Eric Battalio implemented the experimental design on the TAMU economics laboratory network. This paper was revised while Van Huyck was on a faculty development leave at the University of Pittsburgh. Abstract: This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly.(More)
This paper reports an experiment testing whether strategically equivalent representations of a social situation produce equivalent behavior when actually played by human subjects. The investigation was limited to representative members of the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of perfect information, which include widely studied games in the(More)
This paper reports an experiment designed to discover how the prospect of future interaction influences people's ability to tacitly cooperate in repeated dominance solvable games. The experiment varies two treatment variables: whether the constituent game is solvable by strict or iterated dominance and whether prospective interaction is finitely or randomly(More)