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Most implementations of public key cryptography employ exponentiation algorithms. Side-channel attacks on secret exponents are typically bound to the leakage of single executions due to cryptographic protocols or side-channel countermeasures such as blinding. We propose for the first time, to use a well-established class of algorithms, i.e. un-supervised(More)
Leakage-resilient cryptography aims at developing new algorithms for which physical security against side-channel attacks can be formally analyzed. Following the work of Dziembowski and Pietrzak at FOCS 2008, several symmetric cryptographic primitives have been investigated in this setting. Most of them can be instantiated with a block cipher as underlying(More)
The electromagnetic eld as a side-channel of cryptographic devices has been linked to several advantages in past contributions. We provide a comprehensive study using high-resolution horizontal and vertical magnetic eld probes at close distance to an integrated circuit die. We congured an FPGA device with two uncorrelated digital structures showing similar(More)
The DECT Standard Cipher (DSC) is a proprietary stream cipher used for enciphering payload of DECT transmissions such as cord-less telephone calls. The algorithm was kept secret, but a team of cryp-tologists reverse-engineered it and published a way to reduce the key space when enough known keystreams are available [4]. The attack consists of two phases: At(More)
We present a fault emulation environment capable of injecting single and multiple transient faults in sequential as well as combinational logic. It is used to perform fault injection campaigns during design verification of security circuits such as smart cards. In order to reduce the unacceptable hardware overhead of fault emulation for combinational(More)