Johan Eyckmans

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We combine the newest concepts of non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the formation of multiple coalitions. The coalition games represent(More)
Information on ETSAP, its activities and members is also provided on the Internet. The home page contains the latest news, general information on ETSAP, and links to: ETSAP members; ETSAP 'outreach' activities ; description of the MARKAL model and its users; archives of new items; selected publications and the ETSAP Newsletter. Under the 1997 Kyoto(More)
The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a(More)
We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of d'Aspremont et al. (1983). These schemes are " almost ideal " in(More)
This paper investigates the coalitional stability of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on the emissions of greenhouse gases. Unlike conventional coalition stability tests we assume that potential deviators are farsighted in the sense of Chwe 1994 and take i n to account possible subsequent deviations by the remaining players. In the empirical part of the paper, a(More)
We analyze the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) employing the widely used concept of internal&external stability and suggest several modifications. Coun-triesóbjective functions are derived from from an integrated assessement model of climate change. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns(More)
In this paper we introduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation CWS model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang 1996. We rst state the necessary conditions that determine optimal investment and emission abatement paths under alternative cooperation(More)
Combustion of fossil fuels causes carbon emissions which contribute to global climate change. But combustion processes are also responsible for sulphur emissions and sulphate aerosols ooset part of the global warming problem since they increase locally the albedo of the Earth's atmosphere. However, sulphate aerosols contribute to the regional acidiication(More)
Strategic market behavior by permit sellers will harm the European Union as the EU as a whole is expected to become a large net buyer of permits in a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. In this paper we explore how the EU could benefit from making permit trade agreements with non-EU countries. These trade agreements involve a minimum permit sales(More)