This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the utility from outcomes of the individual and his opponents. The weight one player places… (More)
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Economic theorists have intensively studied learning in games and decisions over the last decade. This essay puts some of the work in perspective and offers opinions about what still needs to be learned.
Given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. Any constrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a Nash equilibrium outcome for the… (More)
—Equilibrium models of costless strategic communication provide four insights, which can be summarized informally by: failure to communicate is always possible; perfect communication is not possible when conflict of interest exists between the informed Sender and the uninformed Receiver; whenever non-trivial communication is possible, there are multiple… (More)
This paper studies cheap talk games by imposing a monotonicity condition on Sender strategies and then applies iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. This procedure selects among Crawford and Sobel (1982) equilibria, typically selecting the outcome with the maximal number of induced actions. Other refinements, such as NITS, select the same… (More)
This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's… (More)
This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by U(x or combinations of these functionals. The main assumption is partial separability, where changing a common component of two vectors does not reverse strict preferences , but may turn strict preferences into indifference. We discuss applications of our results to… (More)
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