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This paper considers a version of Bush and Mosteller's ([5], [6]) stochastic learning theory in the context of games. We compare this model of learning to a model of biological evolution. The purpose is to investigate analogies between learning and evolution. We ¯nd that in the continuous time limit the biological model coincides with the deterministic,(More)
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Common intuition and experimental psychology suggest that the ability to self-regulate, willpower, is a depletable resource. We investigate the behavior of an agent who optimally consumes a cake (or paycheck or workload) over time and who recognizes that restraining his consumption too much would exhaust his willpower and leave him unable to manage his(More)
We design four simple cheap-talk games to experimentally investigate the refinement concept of neologism-proofness. All four games admit fully revealing equilibrium, but whether the equilibrium is neologism-proof varies across the games. We find that neol-ogisms played an evident role in how subjects played the games. Overall, fully revealing equilibria(More)
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can(More)
We develop an equilibrium framework that relaxes the standard assumption that people have a correctly-specified view of their environment. Each player is characterized by a (possibly misspecified) subjective model, which describes the set of feasible beliefs over payoff-relevant consequences as a function of actions. We introduce the notion of a Berk-Nash(More)
In the study of decision making under risk, preferences are assumed to be continuous. We present a model of discontinuous preferences over certain and uncertain outcomes. Using existing parameter estimates for certain and uncertain utility, five important decision theory phenomena are discussed: the certainty effect, experimentally observed probability(More)
  • Navin Kartik, And R Preston Mcafee, Mcafee, Divi, Nageeb Ali, Ethan Bueno De Mesquita +7 others
  • 2006
We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have " character " and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter's utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a(More)