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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you(More)
  • Coralio Ballestery, Antoni Calvó-Armengolz, +7 authors Sérgio Vicente
  • 2005
Finite population non-cooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payo¤ complementarities, together with a globally uniform payo¤ substitutability component and an ownconcavity e¤ect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is(More)
S CAPITAL describes circumstances in which individuals can use membership in groups and networks to secure benefits. This formulation follows the definition offered by Pierre Bourdieu (1986): “Social capital is an attribute of an individual in a social context. One can acquire social capital through purposeful actions and can transform social capital into(More)
392 ∗ Sobel: University of California, San Diego. I presented a version of this paper at the First World Congress of the Game Theory Society and to my colleagues at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I thank Eli Berman, Antonio Cabrales, Miguel CostaGomes, Vincent Crawford, David M. Kreps, Herbert Gintis, Mark Machina, Efe Ok, Luís(More)
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Oxford University(More)
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in(More)
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you(More)
Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is inherently risky. This is problematic when studying time preferences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present-biased behavior. We systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment. Discounted expected utility performs well with risk, but when certainty(More)
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Oxford University(More)