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- Joël Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis, Daniel Wichs
- CRYPTO
- 2009

We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of such information is bounded by some parameter ℓ. We construct a variety of leakage-resilient public-key systems including the first… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis, Moni Naor, Gil Segev, Shabsi Walfish, Daniel Wichs
- EUROCRYPT
- 2009

We construct the first public-key encryption scheme in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (BRM), providing security against various forms of adversarial " key leakage " attacks. In this model, the adversary is allowed to learn arbitrary information about the decryption key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of " leakage " is bounded by at most… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Chris Peikert
- STACS
- 2008

We revisit the problem of generating a 'hard' random lattice together with a basis of relatively short vectors. This problem has gained in importance lately due to new cryptographic schemes that use such a procedure to generate public/secret key pairs. In these applications, a shorter basis corresponds to milder underlying complexity assumptions and smaller… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Stephan Krenn, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Daniel Wichs
- CRYPTO
- 2013

The learning with rounding (LWR) problem, introduced by Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [BPR12] at EUROCRYPT '12, is a variant of learning with errors (LWE), where one replaces random errors with deterministic rounding. The LWR problem was shown to be as hard as LWE for a setting of parameters where the modulus and modulus-to-error ratio are super-polynomial.… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis, Daniel Wichs
- ICITS
- 2009

This survey paper studies recent advances in the field of Leakage-Resilient Cryptography. This booming area is concerned with the design of cryptographic primitives resistant to arbitrary side-channel attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Vladimir Serbinenko
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2014

We develop new theoretical tools for proving lower-bounds on the (amortized) complexity of certain functions in models of parallel computation. We apply the tools to construct a class of functions with high amortized memory complexity in the *parallel* Random Oracle Model (pROM); a variant of the standard ROM allowing for batches of *simultaneous* queries.… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Abhi Shelat, Ivan Visconti
- CRYPTO
- 2008

Prior approaches [15, 14] to building collusion-free protocols require exotic channels. By taking a conceptually new approach, we are able to use a more digitally-friendly communication channel to construct protocols that achieve a stronger collusion-free property. We consider a communication channel which can filter and rerandomize message traffic. We then… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Giuseppe Persiano, Abhi Shelat, Ivan Visconti
- CRYPTO
- 2008

Collusion-free protocols prevent subliminal communication (i.e., covert channels) between parties running the protocol. In the standard communication model (and assuming the existence of one-way functions), protocols satisfying any reasonable degree of privacy cannot be collusion-free. To circumvent this impossibility result, Alwen et al. recently suggested… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Jonathan Katz, Ueli Maurer, Vassilis Zikas
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2011

In collusion-free protocols, subliminal communication is impossible and parties are thus unable to communicate any information " beyond what the protocol allows. " Collusion-free protocols are interesting for several reasons, but have specifically attracted attention because they can be used to reduce trust in game-theoretic mechanisms. Collusion-free… (More)

- Joël Alwen, Giuseppe Persiano, Ivan Visconti
- CRYPTO
- 2005

In this paper, we continue the study the round complexity of black-box zero knowledge in the bare public-key (BPK, for short) model previously started by Micali and Reyzin in [11]. Specifically we show the impossibility of 3-round concurrent (and thus resettable) black-box zero-knowledge argument systems with sequential soundness for non-trivial languages.… (More)