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- Jingang Zhao
- 1998

This paper establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity (or supermodulari-ty) in oligopoly games.

- Jingang Zhao
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 1999

- Jingang Zhao, Hajime Miyazaki, James Peck, ChengZhong Qin, Karl Shell
- 2000

Consider an oligopoly market of n firms. If the firms have been merged into a monopolist, then the market must have a non-empty core (otherwise, the final allocation of monopoly profits would have been rejected by at least one blocking coalition). In general, the core of any observed merger must be non-empty. This paper provides two core-existence results:… (More)

- Donald J. Smythe, Jingang Zhao, Steven Heubeck
- 2000

This paper extends Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for horizontal mergers to be both profitable and welfare-enhancing when market demand and firms' costs are linear. We show that profitable, welfare-enhancing mergers are likely to involve firms whose combined pre-merger market shares exceed 50%,… (More)

- Steven Heubeck, Donald J. Smythe, Jingang Zhao, STEVEN HEUBECK, DONALD J. SMYTHE, JINGANG ZHAO
- 2006

This paper extends Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for horizontal mergers to be both profitable and welfare-enhancing when market demand and firms' costs are linear. We show that profitable, welfare-enhancing mergers are likely to involve firms whose combined pre-merger market shares exceed 50%,… (More)

More economists are interested in analyzing situations in which cooperative behavior within a coalition coexists with strategic behavior across the coalitions. The underlying equilibrium is defined as the hybrid solution with a distribution rule (HSDR), which could contribute to these studies to the same extent that Nash equilibrium does to strategic… (More)

- Jingang Zhao
- 2007

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how… (More)

- Jingang Zhao
- 2009

This paper solves merger formation problem in Cournot oligopolies by a cooperative and computational approach. In three-firm linear oligopolies, monopoly will be formed (or be stable) if its merging cost is sufficiently low and cost differentials are sufficiently large. When monopoly is unprofitable due to high merging costs, a profitable two-member merger… (More)

- Jingang Zhao
- 2001

This note is motivated by the similarity between multiobjective programming (MOP) and bargaining theory. It uses the known MOP concepts to establish two new bargaining results: (1) the efficiency of Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) and Nash (NA) solutions for large classes of bargaining problems can be refined to the sharper concept of proper efficiency; (2) the… (More)

- Donald J. Smythe, Jingang Zhao
- 2002

This paper completely characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions and technological spill-overs in a general Cournot model. It shows that a cost reduction by an individual firm (a technological spill-over within a set of firms) increases welfare if and only if the firm's market share (the weighted sum of the members' shares) is greater than a… (More)