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Consider an oligopoly market of n firms. If the firms have been merged into a monopolist, then the market must have a non-empty core (otherwise, the final allocation of monopoly profits would have been rejected by at least one blocking coalition). In general, the core of any observed merger must be non-empty. This paper provides two core-existence results:(More)
This paper extends Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for horizontal mergers to be both profitable and welfare-enhancing when market demand and firms' costs are linear. We show that profitable, welfare-enhancing mergers are likely to involve firms whose combined pre-merger market shares exceed 50%,(More)
This paper extends Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for horizontal mergers to be both profitable and welfare-enhancing when market demand and firms' costs are linear. We show that profitable, welfare-enhancing mergers are likely to involve firms whose combined pre-merger market shares exceed 50%,(More)
More economists are interested in analyzing situations in which cooperative behavior within a coalition coexists with strategic behavior across the coalitions. The underlying equilibrium is defined as the hybrid solution with a distribution rule (HSDR), which could contribute to these studies to the same extent that Nash equilibrium does to strategic(More)
This note is motivated by the similarity between multiobjective programming (MOP) and bargaining theory. It uses the known MOP concepts to establish two new bargaining results: (1) the efficiency of Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) and Nash (NA) solutions for large classes of bargaining problems can be refined to the sharper concept of proper efficiency; (2) the(More)