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- Jingang Zhao
- 1998

This paper establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity (or supermodulari-ty) in oligopoly games.

- Jingang Zhao, Rick Percy, David Schmeidler, Lin Zhou
- 2000

This note provides two necessary and sufficient conditions for the relative interior of the core (and the base polyhedron) to be non-empty: (i) the second largest excess of the prenucleolus is negative; (ii) the grand coalition's payoff is greater than the m inimum no-blocking payoff. Such conditions imply an intuitive method in proving core existence, they… (More)

- Jingang Zhao
- 1992

Note: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. Requests for single copies of a Paper will be filled by the Cowles Foundation within the limits of the supply. References in publications to Discussion Papers (other than mere acknowledgment by a writer that he has access to such… (More)

- Jingang Zhao
- 2000

Consider an oligopoly market of n firms. If the firms have been merged into a monopolist, then the market must have a non-empty core (otherwise, the final allocation of monopoly profits would have been rejected by at least one blocking coalition). In general, the core of any observed merger must be non-empty. This paper provides two core-existence results:… (More)

- Jingang Zhao
- 2007

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how… (More)

- Steven Heubeck, Donald J Smythe, Jingang Zhao
- 2006

This paper extends Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for horizontal mergers to be both profitable and welfare-enhancing when market demand and firms' costs are linear. We show that profitable, welfare-enhancing mergers are likely to involve firms whose combined pre-merger market shares exceed 50%,… (More)

- Donald J Smythe, Jingang Zhao, Steven Heubeck
- 2000

This paper extends Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for horizontal mergers to be both profitable and welfare-enhancing when market demand and firms' costs are linear. We show that profitable, welfare-enhancing mergers are likely to involve firms whose combined pre-merger market shares exceed 50%,… (More)

- Jingang Zhao, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Roger Lagunoff, Dan Levin, James Peck, Debraj Ray +1 other
- 2000

More economists are interested in analyzing situations in which cooperative behavior within a coalition coexists with strategic behavior across the coalitions. The underlying equilibrium is defined as the hybrid solution with a distribution rule (HSDR), which could contribute to these studies to the same extent that Nash equilibrium does to strategic… (More)

- Jingang Zhao, Eric Howe
- 2010

We define and invert a large class of M k matrices that arise from industrial organization. Our inverses lead to closed-form expressions, previously unknown, for oligopoly equilibria with arbitrary coalition structures. We also provide an open problem for future research.

- Jingang Zhao
- 2009

This paper solves merger formation problem in Cournot oligopolies by a cooperative and computational approach. In three-firm linear oligopolies, monopoly will be formed (or be stable) if its merging cost is sufficiently low and cost differentials are sufficiently large. When monopoly is unprofitable due to high merging costs, a profitable two-member merger… (More)