Jesper Rüdiger

Publications14
h-index5
Citations57
Highly Influential Citations4
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  • Publications
  • Influence
Delegated Certification ∗
TLDR
It is shown that if candidates to be certified are able to disclose information about their types, then inflexible rules imposed on certifiers could worsen certification, by crowding out information disclosure from candidates.
Testing, disclosure and approval
How to Persuade a Long-Run Decision Maker
TLDR
It is shown that, with a deadline by which the receiver must act, for intermediate precision of the news the sender generates information in dribs and drabs, and more precise news can improve the welfare of the sender even though better news means the sender loses control over the flow of information.
Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information
A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside…
Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets?
We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain…
Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets?
We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain…
Testing, Disclosure and Approval
TLDR
It is shown that the inability of a certifier to commit to the amount of information to be acquired can result in a reduction of information disclosed.
Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion with Public News
We study the effect of the arrival of exogenous news in dynamic games of Bayesian persuasion. A sender seeks approval from a receiver for a proposal of unknown quality. The receiver can delay his…
Cross-Checking the Media
A characteristic of the news market is that consumers often cross-check information, i.e. observe several news outlets. At the same time, data on political media suggest that more partisan consumers…
Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information
A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside…
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