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The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus… (More)

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves. The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-negative number, t. The… (More)

We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities. One player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the other, who takes the decision. This process is modeled as a game. Qualitative properties of the equilibria are analyzed. The… (More)

We present a method for evaluating the welfare of a decision maker, based on observed choice data. Unlike the standard economic theory of revealed preference, our method is can be used whether or not the observed choices are rational. Paralleling the standard theory we present a model for choice such that the observations arise "as if" they were the result… (More)

We take a decision theoretic approach to the classic social choice problem , using data on the frequency of choice problems to compute social choice functions. We define a family of social choice rules that depend on the population's preferences and on the probability distribution over the sets of feasible alternatives that the society will face. Our… (More)

This paper considers a macroeconomic model with rational expectations in which prices are incompletely flexible. Markets therefore fail to clear. In such a model monetary policy is not neutral. The variance of real and nominal quantities and interest rates is sensitive to the parameters of the feedback rule that determines the money supply. The monetary… (More)

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