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One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however, exist without signaling, and the mechanisms by which hosts might select the right partners(More)
  • Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu, William R Zame, Dilip Abreu, Dirk Bergemann +9 others
  • 2005
The sensitivity of Bayesian implementation to agents'beliefs about others suggests the use of more robust notions of implementation such as ex-post implementation, which requires that each agent's strategy be optimal for every possible realization of the types of other agents. We show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post(More)
The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different(More)
  • Matthew O Jackson, Leeat Yariv, Z We, Nageeb Ali, Sandro Ambuehl, James Andreoni +21 others
  • 2011
We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, any Pareto e¢ cient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time inconsistent. We also show that utilitarian aggregation necessitates a present bias, and decisions made via(More)
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk aversion. Rejecting a gamble over a given range of wealth levels imposes a lower bound on risk aversion. Using this lower bound and empirical evidence on the range of the risk aversion coefficient, we calibrate the relationship between risk attitudes over small-stakes and(More)
This paper shows that in situations in which the preferences of multiple selves are aggregated into a collective decision, even if the researcher has a fully specified theory of how preferences get aggregated, there are typically no testable implications of the theory unless there is an a priori restriction on the number of selves. This result has(More)
Subsidies in the Affordable Care Act exchanges and other health insurance programs depend on prices set by insurers – as prices rise, so do subsidies. We show that these " price-linked " subsidies incentivize higher prices, with a magnitude that depends on how much insurance demand rises when the price of uninsurance (the mandate penalty) increases. To(More)
A large literature demonstrates that contexts and frames influence decisions. This malleabil-ity of choice is usually invoked as evidence against the assumption that people maximize a stable preference ordering. In a market equilibrium, however, contexts and frames provide payoff-relevant information to consumers: the information implicit in a firm's(More)
Perturbed utility functions—the sum of expected utility and a non-linear perturbation function—provide a simple and tractable way to model various sorts of stochastic choice. We provide two easily understood conditions each of which characterizes this representation: One condition generalizes the acyclicity condition used in revealed preference theory, and(More)
We model a DM as a collection of utility functions (selves, rationales) and an aggregation rule (a theory of how selves are activated by choice sets) on which we impose five simple axioms of social choice. This framework encompasses many multi-self models proposed in the existing literature. For a broad class of aggregators we show that with sufficiently(More)