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We study a dynamic network formation game. Alternately, agents are allowed to add, remove or replace links among them. The goal of each of them is to maximize his own payoff, which is a function ofâ€¦ (More)

- Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, Jeroen Kuipers
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2001

We consider classes of cooperative games. We show that we can eeciently compute an allocation in the intersection of the prekernel and the least core of the game if we can eeciently compute theâ€¦ (More)

- JÃ¡nos Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eilon Solan, Koos Vrieze
- Math. Oper. Res.
- 2010

We prove that every multi-player perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect Îµ-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3â€¦ (More)

- Javier Arin, Jeroen Kuipers, Dries Vermeulen
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2003

In this paper we derive characterizations of egalitarian solutions on two subclasses of the class of balanced games. Firstly we show that the Duttaâ€“Ray solution is the only solution that satisfiesâ€¦ (More)

- Javier Arin, Jeroen Kuipers, Dries Vermeulen
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2008

A core concept is a solution concept on the class of balanced games that exclusively selects core allocations. We show that every continuous core concept that satisfies both the equal treatmentâ€¦ (More)

- Jean Derks, Jeroen Kuipers
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 1997

A repairman makes a round-trip along a set of customers. He starts in his home location, visits each customer exactly once, and returns home. The cost of his trip has to be shared by the customers. Aâ€¦ (More)

- Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, Jeroen Kuipers
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 1998

We prove that computing the nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is in general NP-hard. The proof uses a reduction from minimum cover problems.

- Jeroen Kuipers, TamÃ¡s Solymosi, Harry Aarts
- Math. Program.
- 2000

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. Theâ€¦ (More)

- Jeroen Kuipers, Dries Vermeulen, Mark Voorneveld
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2010

The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalenceâ€¦ (More)