Jernej Copic

Learn More
Networks of social and economic interactions are often influenced by unobserved structures among the nodes. We develop a simple model of how hidden community structure generates networks of interactions and then axiomatize a method of identifying the latent community structures from network data. The method is based on maximum likelihood estimation. ∗Čopič(More)
We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer-to-peer (p2p) …le sharing and centralized client-server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p …le sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the(More)
Because they provide exclusive property rights, patents are generally considered to be an effective way to promote intellectual discovery. Here, we propose a different compensation scheme, in which everyone holds shares in the components of potential discoveries and can trade those shares in an anonymous market. In it, incentives to invent are indirect,(More)
We provide a model of awareness in normal-form games with incomplete information. Players and actions are common knowledge but types and probability distribution over these are not. Each player is aware of a subset of types and a joint distribution over these, and holds conjectures about other players’ awareness and conjectures. In an awareness equilibrium,(More)
We consider bilateral trade problems subject to incomplete information on the reservation values of the agents. We address negotiations where the communication of proposals takes place though the filter of a third party, a mediator: traders submit proposals over continuous time to the mediator that receives bids and keeps them secret until they are(More)
This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information acquisition. First, we develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation. We then show that(More)