Jernej Copic

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Networks of social and economic interactions are often influenced by unobserved structures among the nodes. We develop a simple model of how hidden community structure generates networks of interactions and then axiomatize a method of identifying the latent community structures from network data. The method is based on maximum likelihood estimation. and(More)
Because they provide exclusive property rights, patents are generally considered to be an effective way to promote intellectual discovery. Here, we propose a different compensation scheme, in which everyone holds shares in the components of potential discoveries and can trade those shares in an anonymous market. In it, incentives to invent are indirect,(More)
We provide a model of awareness in normal-form games with incomplete information. Players and actions are common knowledge but types and probability distribution over these are not. Each player is aware of a subset of types and a joint distribution over these, and holds conjectures about other players' awareness and conjectures. In an awareness equilibrium,(More)
We study the impact of delegated portfolio management on asset pricing in a large-scale experimental setting. With a few exceptions, models of asset pricing are formulated in terms of the preference functions of final investors. This effectively assumes that adding a layer of management does not affect market equilibrium. In early rounds of our experiments,(More)
Business School, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Australasian Meetings of the Econometrics Society (2008) for their insightful comments. I am also thankful to Tracy Francis, Neal Lerner, and Tamir Maltz for helpful conversations about their own professional practices as advisors to …rms. All mistakes are, of course, my own. Abstract This(More)
The Guggenheim Foundation, and the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences for financial support. I am very grateful to collaborators on networks projects, who have helped me learn about social networks and the fascinating questions they present; and who are inexorably tied to the views I take herein. So I thank (in chronological order),
This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information acquisition. First, we develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation. We then show that(More)