Jens Großer

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This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot response game supports this prediction. Subjects are 67% more(More)
Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making “others’ behaviour” a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without(More)
Jens Großer is an Assistant Professor at the Departments of Political Science and Economics, Florida State University and Experimental Social Science at Florida State (xs/fs), 531 Bellamy Hall, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2230 ( Arthur Schram is a Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam and the Center for Research in Experimental(More)
Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This paper proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These non-pecuniary costs(More)
We study majority voting over two alternatives in small groups. Individuals have identical preferences but are uncertain about which alternative can better achieve their common interest. Before voting, each individual can get informed, to wit, buy a valuable but imperfect signal about the better alternative. Voting is either voluntary or compulsory. In the(More)
We investigate theoretically and experimentally the “crisis bargaining model,” a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Little work has been done to analyze whether and how players update their beliefs in such games. Within the experiment we elicited beliefs from players about their(More)
Cluster-robust standard errors (as implemented by the eponymous cluster option in Stata) can produce misleading inferences when the number of clusters G is small, even if the model is consistent and there are many observations in each cluster. Nevertheless, political scientists commonly employ this method in data sets with few clusters. The contributions of(More)