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In this article, we provide guidance for substantive researchers on the use of structural equation modeling in practice for theory testing and development. We present a comprehensive, two-step modeling approach that employs a series of nested models and sequential chi-square difference tests. We discuss the comparative advantages of this approach over a… (More)

We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually… (More)

This paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long-run consumption or utility. Given exponential utility, it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments. Next, it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents… (More)

* Groupware and Workflow Management Systems are now moving into full-scale implementation in enterprises. Many organizations are now capturing competitive advantage from these systems. What will be the next IT opportunity for competitive advantage? This paper lays out elements of an enterprise information architecture, based on the view that the next IT… (More)

- ITZHAK GILBOA, J. L. Kellogg, +5 authors Hugo Sonnenschein
- 2003

The " stochastic binary choice problem " is the following: Let there be given n alternatives, to be denoted by N= { 1,. .. . n}. For each of the n! possible linear orderings { > " }k= r of the alternatives, define a matrix Y!,T',,(1 < nt < n!) as follows: yp ZZ 1 a> " b 0 otherwise. Given a real matrix Q,X:,, when is Q in the convex hull of { Y'm'},? In… (More)

Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that… (More)

SUMMARY Using the technique of Wan and Davis, we give an existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium point in N-person non-zero sum stochastic jump differential games. lt is shown that if the Nash condition (generalized Isaacs condition) holds there is a Nash equilibrium point in feedback srrategies. We ertend the results to other solution concepts and discuss… (More)

for helpful comments and suggestions. Abstract A population of individuals is divided into groups. Individuals are recurrently randomly matched with individuals from their group to play a generic symmetric 2-player game. Deterministic inter-and intra-group dynamics are derived from a model of individual imitation within groups and individual migration… (More)

- Leonard C. Soffer, J. L. Kellogg, Larry Revsine, Jim Wahlen, L. Kellogg
- 1999

SYNOPSIS One of the cornerstones of financial statement analysis is the discounted cash flow valuation. Despite the broad use of this valuation technique, and the economic importance of employee stock options to firm values, there is little guidance on how employee stock options should be incorporated in a valuation. This paper provides a comprehensive… (More)

- Peter Klibano, J. L. Kellogg, Paolo Ghirardato, Itzhak Gilboa, David Laibson, Matthew Rabin
- 1997

This paper o®ers a new equilibrium concept for ¯nite normal form games motivated by the idea that players may have preferences which display uncertainty aversion. More speci¯cally, it adopts the representation of preferences presented in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Then an equilibrium with uncertainty aversion is de¯ned and applied to a number of simple… (More)