Jeffrey S. Banks

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We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters,(More)
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops,(More)
W e augmentthe standard Crawford-Sobel(Econometrica 1 982) modelofcheap talkcommunication byallowingthe informed party tousebothcostlessandcostlymessages.Theissuesonwhichwefocus aretheconsequences forcheap talksignalingoftheoption tousea costlysignal(\ burnedmoney");thecircumstances underwhichboth cheap talkandburnedmoneyareusedtosignalinformation;andthe(More)
We unify and extend much of the literature on probabilistic voting in two-candidate elections. We give existence results for mixed and pure strategy equilibria of the electoral game. We prove general results on optimality of pure strategy equilibria vis-a-vis a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, and we derive the well-known “mean voter” result as(More)
We consider the Nash implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational solutions in the context of matching problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these solutions, we show that the ``lower bound'' stable rule and the ``upper bound'' Pareto and individually rational rule are Nash implementable. The proofs(More)
We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably in...nite strategy spaces, and, as a special case, we obtain a longstanding claim to the same e¤ect, due to McKelvey (1986),(More)
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in amajority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from amultidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We(More)