Jeanne Hagenbach

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We consider situations in which every agent would like to take an action that is coordinated with those of others, as well as close to a common state of nature, with the ideal proximity to that state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, agents decide to whom they reveal their private information about the state. The information(More)
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information sharing. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We characterize the augmented games in which there exists a full disclosure sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation(More)
In this appendix, we develop a way to construct fully revealing equilibria by working directly with ex post masquerading payoffs, without having to aggregate them.By doing so, we can show existence of a fully revealing equilibrium when the ex post masquerading payoffs have increasing differences, regardless of the information structure. The idea is that to(More)
We characterize sufficient conditions for full and decentralized disclosure of hard information in organizations with asymmetrically informed and self interested agents with quadratic loss functions. Incentive conflicts arise because agents have different (and possibly interdependent) ideal actions and different incentives to coordinate with each others. A(More)
We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing. Agents value being connected to other agents and sharing and(More)
We analyze a dynamic search and matching model with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. Randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase before they discover each other's types and decide to match or not. Before deciding to enter this phase, agents can send a cheap-talk message about their type to their partner. We provide conditions(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Available online xxxx JEL classification: D83 C72 L22 Keywords: Communication network Communication dilemma Dynamic network game Strategic communication War of attrition In the dynamic game we analyze, players are the members of a fixed network. Everyone is initially endowed with an information item that he is the only(More)
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