Jean-Philippe Bonardi

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Membership in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the World Trade Organization, has long been argued to stimulate trade. Yet, evidence linking IGOs to trade is mixed. The authors argue that identifying the influence of IGOs requires attention not only to the institutions IGOs enact, but also to the network through which they enact them.(More)
In deregulated industries former monopolies often adopt asymmetric behaviors: these firms impede the entry of foreign competitors in their home market, especially using defensive political strategies, and, at the same time, aggressively develop international strategies in foreign markets. To account for this behavior, I develop a game theoretic model(More)
Building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of 'political markets' – where firms transact over public policies with government policy-makers – we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms' nonmarket strategies. We propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of(More)
SUMARIO La verificación de la convergencia o no de regulaciones y leyes nacionales en el contexto de la globalización internacional, y la evaluación de este proceso, han sido objeto de una vasta literatura. Sin embargo, la aplicación específica a la regulación de servicios públicos ha recibido poca atención. Este documento propone un modelo simple que(More)
The imitation of successful peers is often heralded as an intelligent shortcut to reduce individual learning costs. Using computer simulations, we demonstrate that this advice can be ill-founded and harmful in a cognitive inference task involving continuous learning. In particular, success-based imitators perform worse than both learners who integrate the(More)
Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts’ cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient.(More)
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